Recently we have seen increased conservative sentiment in mass consciousness. This sentiment, which has always been shared by many Russian citizens, now is largely being stoked and supported by a deliberate policy of the government.  The reasons are also generally clear. During the 2000s, the government maintained its claim to legitimacy largely through its proclaimed policy of raising prosperity levels for the population and encouraging higher consumerist expectations. This was in effect a policy of creating a consumerist society in Russia. This policy by definition was aimed at bringing the nation into the fold of global civilization, promoting its integration into the ‘community’ of Western states. So it was only natural that throughout the 2000s, the Russian government was proclaiming the “European choice” of Russia – with a varying degree of intensity.

Today, the situation is fundamentally different. Prosperity drive has been put into question in the current economic environment. In this context, the government can establish its legitimacy in a traditionalist version of conservatism only, making sure it is presented as a tool to counter the West and its modernist culture.

 

A project for fostering a “new conservative citizen” is grounded in these perceptions of modern realities. Such a citizen should be capable of sacrificing their well-being and individual choices for the sake of the state. The big question is: Is Russian society willing to commit itself to such a project?

 

There is a quite widespread view that for most Russians the recent value transformations proved to be superficial and are currently being reversed under the influence of many factors – both internal and external. However, even if we agreed with the argument that the majority of the population rejects modernist values, we wouldn’t fail to admit that current Russian society is different from that of the Stalin era, or the Soviet society of the Brezhnev stagnation period; it is also different from the 1990s post-Soviet society...

 

It is a consumerist society not only, and perhaps not as much, economically as socially and psychologically. It is used to getting various benefits without bothering to ponder whether its contribution matches these goods. It is used to getting easy “bread” and still hopes for some “circuses” as well. It is unlikely to be willing to sacrifice the lives of several generations for the defence of a “fortress state”. In this regard, the question about the phenomenon of modern mass conservatism can be put differently: Could it be an opportunistic phenomenon, the very emergence of which was due to a combination of various factors with time-varying influence?  E.g. a relatively stable social and economic situation and the simultaneous shattering of hopes for steady growth of prosperity in the nearest years and denial of social mobility to the majority of the population?

              

The Round Table discussed the following questions:

 

1. What are the goals and substance of the “Project for fostering a ‘new conservative’ citizen for today’s Russia”?

2. How do traditional and modernist values correlate in the mentality of the Russian population? Do we see a “renaissance” of traditional values and their growing influence on the mentality and social behaviors of Russians?

3. How does the influence of traditional values vary from one social and age group to another?

4. Can we argue that the “new Russian conservatism” is a long-term fundamental trend or is it a transient phenomenon, a result of a combination of temporary circumstances? 

 

Participants in the round table discussion included Vasily Zharkov (the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration), Andrey Zakharov (Russian State University for the Humanities), Grigory Kertman (the Public Opinion Foundation), Marina Krasilnikova (Levada Center), Vladimir Petukhov (Institute of Sociology, the Russian Academy of Sciences), Vladimir Rimsky (INDEM Foundation), Viktor Sheinis (Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences), Andrey Ryabov (IMEMO and the Gorbachev Foundation), Aleksandr Veber, Olga Zdravomyslova,  Georgy Ostroumov, Pavel Palazhchenko and Boris Slavin (the Gorbachev Foundation).

 

Co-hosting the round table were Olga Zdravomyslova and Andrey Ryabov