

Ulrich Beck

Living in and Coping with World Risk Society:

The Cosmopolitan Turn*

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When a world-order collapses, then the analysis begins, though that doesn't seem to hold for the type of social thinking social theory currently prevalent. With universalist aloofness and somnambulant certainty, it hovers above the currents of epochal change.

Just think for a moment of the 'cosmopolitical events' that changed the world during the last 25 years – 9/11, the ongoing financial crisis, the ongoing climate change, the ongoing nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, the ongoing Arab spring, the ongoing euro-crisis, the ongoing Occupy-Wall-Street Movement. All of those have at least two features in common: (1) they came and come by total surprise, which means: they are beyond our political and sociological categories and imagination; and (2) all of them are transnational or global in their scope and implications.

From this follows my question: Is it true that today this kind of universalist social analysis [whether it be structuralist, interactionist, Marxist or based on critical or system theory] is antiquated and provincial? *Antiquated* because it excludes what is patent, namely, a paradigm shift in modern society and politics; *provincial* because it falsely absolutizes the path-dependent scope of experience and expectation in Western European and American modernization, thus distorting the sociological view of its particularity?

It would be an understatement to say that European sociology and sociology in general needs to understand the modernization of other societies for supplementary reasons, in order to complete its world-view. It is rather the case that we Europeans can understand ourselves only if we 'deprovincialize' – in other words, if we learn to

* „Cosmopolitanism“ is a loaded concept, especially in the Russian context; it does *not* mean 'unpatriotic sentiment and behavior' as Stalin defined it politically. In my theoretical and empirical perspective the 'cosmopolitan turn' answers to the epistemological challenge of globalization: how can we understand and analyze the new interconnectedness of the world. To put it in a nutshell, my answer is: by looking at ourselves through the eyes of the other – methodologically.

see through the eyes of others as a matter of sociological method. This is what I call the cosmopolitan turn in sociological and political theory and research.

I will develop this argument in five stages.

First, I will call into question one of the most powerful convictions about society and politics, one which binds both social actors and social scientists: methodological nationalism. Methodological nationalism equates modern society with society organized in a territorially limited nation-state.

Second, what is meant by '*cosmopolitization*'? The best way to answer this question is through a paradigmatic example: that of global transplant medicine – '*fresh kidneys*'.

Third, what is new about *world risk society*?

Fourth, how does global risk – the euro-crisis – change the power landscape of Europe?

Fifth, taking climate change as an example, how are new cosmopolitan communities of global risk being imagined and realized?

1. Critique of methodological nationalism

Methodological nationalism assumes that the nation-state and society are the 'natural' social and political forms of the modern world. It assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which on the inside, organize themselves as nation-states, and on the outside set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. This dualism between the national and the international preents the most fundamental category of political organization. Indeed, our political and social scientific frame of reference is rooted in the concept of the nation-state. It is the national outlook on society and politics, law, justice and history that governs the political and sociological imagination. And it is exactly this methodological nationalism that prevents the social sciences and humanities from getting at the heart of the key political dynamics of the world at risk or Europe at risk.

Where social or political actors subscribe to this believe I talk of 'national outlook'; where it determines the perspective of the social scientific observer, I talk of 'methodological nationalism'. The distinction between the perspective of the social actor and that of the social scientist is crucial, because there is only a historical

connection between the two not a logical one. This historical connection – between social actors and social scientists – alone gives rise to the axiomatic of methodological nationalism. And methodological nationalism is not a superficial problem or a minor error. It involves both, the routines of data collection/production and basic concepts of modern sociology, like society, class, state, democracy, family, imagined community etc.

It is evident that, in the 19th century, European sociology was founded and formulated within a nationalist paradigm and that any cosmopolitan sentiments were snuffed out by the horrors of the great wars. In the methodological nationalism of Emile Durkheim, fraternity becomes solidarity and national integration. He, of course, has in mind the integration of the national society – France – without even mentioning it (but true is also, at the same time both – Émile Durkheim and Auguste Comte – referred to cosmopolitanism as a future possible development of modern society). Max Weber's sociology involved a comparative study of economic ethics and world religions, but the political inspiration for his sociology is the national and the nation-state.

The critique of methodological nationalism should not be confused with the thesis that the end of the nation-state has arrived. Nation-states (as all the research shows) will continue to thrive or will be transformed into transnational states (for example, European Union). The decisive point is that national organization as a structuring principle of societal and political action can no longer serve as the orienting reference point for the social scientific observer. One cannot even understand the re-nationalization or re-ethnification trend in Western or Eastern Europe and other parts of the world without a cosmopolitan perspective. In this sense, the social sciences can only respond adequately to the challenge of globalization if they manage to overcome methodological nationalism and to raise empirically and theoretically fundamental questions within specialized fields of research, and thereby elaborate the foundations of a newly formulated cosmopolitan social science.

In order to overcome methodological nationalism we need a cosmopolitan turn, a cosmopolitan perspective.

2. What is meant by 'cosmopolitization'?

We are living in an era not of cosmopolitanism but of cosmopolitization: the 'global other' is in our midst. The concept of cosmopolitization is surrounded by

misunderstandings and misinterpretations. The best way to make it comprehensible is through a paradigmatic example: that of *global transplant medicine*. The victory of global transplant surgery (and not its crises!) has swept away its own ethical foundations and paved the way for a shadow economy that supplies the world market with 'fresh' organs. In a radically unequal world there is clearly no shortage of desperate individuals prepared to sell a kidney, a section of their liver, a lung, an eye, and even a testicle for a pittance. The fate of desperate patients waiting for organs have become obscurely embroiled with the fate of no less desperate people, as each group struggles to find a solution to basic problems of survival. Thus arises what I call *a real-existing cosmopolitization of emergency*.

This impure, banal, coercive cosmopolitization of 'fresh kidneys' bridged the *either/or* between North and South, core and periphery, haves and have-nots. In the individualized bodyscapes continents, races, classes, nations and religions all become fused. Muslim kidneys purify Christian blood. White races breathe with the aid of a black lung. The blond manager gazes out at the world through the eyes of an African street urchin. A Catholic priest survives thanks to the liver carved from a prostitute living in a Brazilian favella. The bodies of the rich become patchwork rugs. Poor people, in contrast, are becoming actual or potential one-eyed or one-kidneyed depositories of square parts. The piecemeal sale of their organs is their life-insurance. At the other end of the line evolves the bio-political 'world citizen' – a white, male body, fit or fat, with an Indian kidney or Muslim eye.

This example illustrates what I mean by 'cosmopolitization': The global poor is not just besides us, the global poor is *in* us – and for that reason alone no longer a 'global other'.

The facts of cosmopolitization are certainly concern of the social sciences, and therefore it is important to clearly distinguish between *philosophical* cosmopolitanism, which is about *norms*, and *sociological* cosmopolitization, which is about *facts*.

Cosmopolitanism, in the philosophical sense of Immanuel Kant and Jürgen Habermas, means something active, a task, a conscious decision, one that is clearly a responsibility of elites and implemented from above. Today, on the other hand, a banal and impure cosmopolitization is unfolding, involuntary, unnoticed, powerfully and aggressively below the surface, behind the façades of existing national spaces, sovereign territories, and etiquettes; from the top of society down to everyday life of

families, in work situations, individual careers and bodies although national flags are still waved and national attitudes, identities and forms of consciousness are even growing stronger.

3. This is exactly the case in the context of world risk society

Why is the concept of 'world risk society' so important in order to understand the social and political dynamics and transformations at the beginning of the 21st century? It is the accumulation of risk – nuclear, ecological, financial, military, terrorist, biochemical and informational – that has an overwhelming presence in our world today. To the extent that risk is experienced as omnipresent, there are only three possible reactions: denial, apathy and transformation. *Denial* is largely inscribed into first modern culture, but ignores the political risk of denial; this is evident, for example, in the case of nuclear energy after Fukushima. *Apathy* gives way to a nihilistic strain in postmodernism. *Transformation* marks the issue the concept world risk society raises: how does the anticipation of a multiplicity of man-made futures and its risky consequences effect and transform the perceptions, living conditions and institutions of modern societies? One of these striking examples is, of course, the global financial crisis and the turmoil it creates in Europe and the world over.

First we have to distinguish between *risk* and *catastrophe*. Risk does *not* mean catastrophe. Risk means the *anticipation* of catastrophe. Risks are about staging the future in the present, whereas the future of future catastrophes is in principle unknown. Without techniques of visualization, without symbolic forms, without mass media, risks are nothing at all. So global risks actually are globally *medialized* risks.

The sociological and political point is: If destruction and disaster are anticipated this produces a compulsion to act. The anticipation of threatening future catastrophes in the present (and the euro-crisis as again a living example) creates all kind turbulences inside national and international institutions but also in everyday life. Politically speaking, global risks create global public which mobilize people beyond all kind of borders, national, religious, ethnical etc. borders.

What is new about world risk society? Modern societies and their foundations are shaken by the global anticipation of global catastrophes (climate change, financial crisis). Such perceptions of globalized manufactured risks and uncertainties are characterized by four features:

- *De-localization*: Their causes and consequences are not limited to one geographical location or space, but are in principle omnipresent.
- *Incalculableness*: Their consequences are in principle incalculable; at bottom it is a matter of 'hypothetical' or 'virtual' risks which, not least, are based on scientifically induced non-knowing and normative dissent.
- *Non-compensability*: The security dream of 19th century European modernity was based on the scientific utopia of making the unsafe consequences and dangers of decision ever more controllable; accidents could occur as long and because they were considered compensable. If the climate has changed irreversibly, if progress in human genetics makes irreversible interventions in human existence possible, if the 'Super-Gau' is happening – then it is too late. Given the new quality of threats to humanity, the logic of compensation breaks down and is replaced by the principle 'precaution by prevention' (François Ewald).

4. How does global risk – the euro-crisis – change the power landscape of Europe?

The common understanding of 'more Europe' is definitely caught by methodological nationalism. This national gaze sees two ways and two ways only of reading contemporary European politics and integration. It sees it either as federation, leading to a federal super-state, or as intergovernmentalism, leading to a federation of states. Both models are empirically inadequate. They fail to grasp essential things both about present-day Europe and about the nations that make it up. But they are also, in a deep-structural sense, anti-European. They deny the goal most worth attaining: a Europe of diversity, a cosmopolitan Europe that helps diversity to flourish.

This is obvious when it comes to the idea of a federation of states that are seen as defending their sovereignty against the expansion of European power. From that perspective, European integration is a kind of European self-colonization. But it's just as true in the conception of a federal super-state. That is how Europe looks when it is filtered through the exclusive categories of national thought, which can only understand it in one way: as a huge (ethno-cultural) nation-state. This makes no sense, as its opponents point out. *One* European nation is improbable, unwanted and un-European. It never occurs to them that perhaps Europe isn't properly conceived of as a nation-state, as a nation-state writ large!

Both the federation of states and the federal super-state describe the same zero-sum game from different angles. Either there is one single state of Europe (federalism), in which case there are no national member states anymore; or else the national member states remain Europe's rulers, in which case there is no Europe (inter-governmentalism). Within this framework of thought, whatever Europe gains, the individual nations lose. And this is true whether one is for a given option or against it.

This is what it means to say that national categories of thought make the thought of Europe impossible. Caught up in the false alternatives of the national outlook, we are giving the choice between no Europe – or no Europe! And this seems exactly to be the situation Europe is in now. The same two sides of one dead-end are as prominent as they have ever been in the current euro-crisis.

Methodological nationalism denies this empirical reality of Europe, which is cosmopolitanized. Let me give you a simple metaphor for this: Europe is like scrambled eggs. If you try to separate the yellow from the white you will fail!

When the euro fails, then the European Union fails too (Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy). This anticipation of the European catastrophe has changed fundamentally the European landscape of power.

This is what the new power landscape of Europe looks like: The grammar of power conforms to the imperial difference between creditor and debtor countries. Thus it is not a military but an economic logic. (In this respect the talk of the 'Fourth Reich' is wide of the mark.) Its ideological foundation is what I am calling *German euro-nationalism*, that is, an extended European version of Deutschmark nationalism. In this way the German culture of stability is being elevated to the guiding idea for Europe.

The consequences are the splitting off the EU. This is reflected, first, in the new internal conflict between the euro-countries and the EU-countries outside the euro zone. Those who do not have the euro find themselves excluded from the decision-making processes which are shaping the present and future of Europe. They find themselves degraded to onlookers and are losing their political voice. This is most apparent in the case of Great Britain which is sliding into European irrelevance.

However, a dramatic split is also occurring in the new, crisis-torn centre of activity of the euro-countries, a split between the countries which already or will soon depend

on the drip feed of the rescue fund and the countries which are financing the rescue fund. The former have no other option but to submit to the claim to power of German euro-nationalism. Italy, perhaps one of the most European countries, is threatened with playing no further role in shaping the present and future of the continent.

Here you have an example how the anticipation of the European catastrophe, how risk is changing the European landscape of power. My point is not just that the euro risk is tearing Europe apart. That is no doubt true. But the crux of the matter is that in the process the basic rules of European democracy are being suspended or are even being inverted into their opposite, bypassing parliaments, governments and EU institutions. Multilateralism is turning into unilateralism, reciprocity into hegemony, sovereignty into the deprivation of sovereignty and recognition into disrespect for the dignity of other nations. Even France, which long dominated European unification, must submit to Berlin's strictures now that it must fear for its international credit rating.

At the same time the euro risk is opening up new possibilities, new spaces for action, new political options, code words are: "bank union", "financial transaction tax", euro-bonds"; "European financial government", directly elected "president of the EU" etc. In fact, the question of how this enormous space comprising 27 member states should be governed if, before every decision, 27 heads of government, cabinets and parliaments have to be convinced, has answered itself, as it were. In contrast to the old EU, the euro zone is de facto a community of two speeds. In future only the euro zone – not the EU – will belong to the avant-garde of Europeanization. This could represent an opportunity for the urgently needed institutional imagination.

Let me pick up another example how the anticipation of catastrophe is changing the world: climate change. Climate change alters society in fundamental ways, by entailing new forms of power, inequality and insecurity – as well as new forms of cooperation and solidarity – on local, national and global scales. Therefore my question is:

5. Are there and how are new 'cosmopolitan communities of risk' being imagined and realized?

The key concept of cosmopolitan risk communities is extended from the work of Benedict Anderson (1983) on the rise of nation-states as 'imagined communities'. As Anderson showed, nationalism is formed not through the face-to-face encounters as

much as the conscious awareness that one is living through and affected by similar experiences and events with distant others. Anderson coined the term 'imagined communities' to refer to how national identity is constructed. My ambition is to extend this concept and address the following question: how can we turn the concept of 'imagined cosmopolitan risk communities' (Beck 2011) into a strong explanatory tool for the entangled social, economic and political consequences of climate change? To unpack this question, three points must be made:

(1) *The dynamics of climate change are Janus-faced:* with climate change, the very notion of 'community' is no longer solely based on shared values. Rather, new global interconnections are established via causal interpretations of threats and responsibilities, which create a space for pragmatic accountabilities. This new cosmopolitan space, which transforms rather than replaces local and national communities, depends heavily on the power of causal definitions; and it is open to negotiation. 'Climate skepticism' illustrates a degree of ambivalence within the natural sciences. Even when a working consensus on the anthropogenic nature of climate change has attained world-wide credibility (Oreskes 2004), a total agreement is unlikely across social and geographical distances. Dynamics of cooperation and conflict continue to intermingle.

(2) *Remapping political power and social inequality of changing climates:* climate change transforms short and long term social inequalities and political antagonisms at local, national, regional and global levels. The emergence of new cosmopolitan communities of risk are essentially shaped by power and resource distribution, social and natural vulnerabilities, and rich and poor regions' perceptions of injustice.*

(3) *Intensified international cooperation becomes the stark realism of a cosmopolitan imperative:* this, finally, raises the question: how can global risks be successfully dealt with under the conditions of multiple competing modernities with their different normative models, material interests and political power constellations? The key to answering this question is provided by the concept of *cosmopolitical realpolitik*. In order to understand and develop this concept it has to be distinguished in particular from normative-philosophical *cosmopolitanism* on the one hand, and idealistic utopian cosmopolitanism (Archibugi 2008; Held 2004) on the other. Cosmopolitical

* This can be studied by the interconnectedness of global cities in climate politics (as I and my team do).

realpolitik does not appeal (at least not primarily) to shared ideas and identities, but to power and interests to be brought into play. If we adopt such a 'realist' perspective, the crucial question is how the hegemonic 'meta-power games' of global domestic politics (Beck 2005; 2012) can be shaped and interests pursued in such a way that they serve the realization of common cosmopolitan goals? In short (following Mandeville 1989 [1714]), how can private vices be transformed into public, cosmopolitan virtues?

The concept of cosmopolitical realpolitik, which aims at answering this question, is based on the following assumptions. The new historical reality of world risk society is that no nation can master its problems alone. Cosmopolitanism, thus understood, calls for neither the sacrifice of one's own interests, nor an exclusive bias towards higher ideas and ideals. On the contrary, it accepts that for the most part political action is interest-based. But it insists on an approach to the pursuit of one's own interests that is compatible with those of a larger community. Thus cosmopolitical realism basically means the recognition of the legitimate interests of others and their inclusion in the calculation of one's own interests. In this process, interests become 'reflexive national interests' through repeated joint strategies of self-limitation; more precisely, empowerment arises from self-limitation. Ideally, individual and collective goals, both national and global, can be achieved simultaneously. In reality, however, there are often limits and dilemmas of cosmopolitan realpolitik (Beck and Grande 2007: chapter 8). It is no panacea for all the world's problems and it by no means always works. In particular, whether a problem has a cosmopolitan solution depends on the normative and institutional framework in which decisions have to be taken. Nevertheless, the basic message of cosmopolitan realpolitik is this: the future is open. It depends on decisions we make.

Arguably for the first time in history, cosmopolitan commitments exert real world significance not only in responding to world risk society. A '*Hegelian*' scenario promises the emergence of a *collaborative cosmopolitan imperative: cooperate or fail!* Human rights or human catastrophe!

However, the euro-crisis suggests a possible sinister alternative, or the '*Carl Schmitt*' scenario: 'normalizing the state of emergency' (Holzinger et al. 2010). Yet, little is known about how these two opposite tendencies intermingle and their social and political consequences.

Outlook

What do I mean by 'cosmopolitan social sciences'?

Firstly, much of the social science literature is caught in a resilient methodological nationalism bound up with the presupposition that the national-territorial remains the primary container for the analysis of social, economic, political and cultural processes. At the beginning of the 21st century, the world risk society is posing a political and theoretical challenge to this idea that binding history and borders tightly together is the only possible means of social and symbolic integration – and analysis!

Secondly, I reject the regular meanings of cosmopolitanism, thus separating it from other concepts such as universalism, globalism, transnationalism, and internationalism, for me cosmopolitization is an *ideal* and *reality* of universalism that maintains a particular dimension, of globality that includes nationalism, and of transnationalism which does not exclude plurality of ethnicities and of cultures.

Thirdly, I propose a *substantive shift*. Cosmopolitization, I claim, is not the *universal antithesis of various particulars* (nationalism, localism, culturalism etc.) but is rather the *synthesis* of previous theories. It is the *overcoming of the dualisms* between universalism and particularism, between internationalism and nationalism, between globalization and localization. Thus cosmopolitization is much more than a political theory, a philosophical utopia (or dystopia for others), a governance programme, a personnel life style or mental state-of-mind. It is the reality of our times.

I turned the argument that cosmopolitanism is an unrealistic ideology on its head, claiming that the proponents of the national are the idealistic one's: they view reality with obsolete national lenses and such cannot see the profound changes in reality, which make their theory antiquated and misguided. To summarize my argument in a pointed statement: In a world risk society nationalism is becoming the enemy of the nation. Cosmopolitization is therefore a perspective for research, a political reality and a normative theory. And it is *the* critical theory of our times, since it challenges the most profound truths which we hold: the national truth.

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